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Discovery and Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Joseph M. McLaughlin*
I. Introduction
I am more or less reliably informed that about every 200,000 years
the magnetic force fields surrounding the North and South Poles reverse
themselves. Compasses point south instead of north. This phenomenon
is known as geomagnetic pole reversal. A similar phenomenon of no less
significance occurred in the federal courts in 1938.
On New Year's Day of 1938 and for much of the preceding century
federal courts applied the rule of Swift v. Tyson,' enabling them in diver-
sity cases to decide common law matters based on their own sense of law
and justice. In April of 1938, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,2 without warning,
held that federal courts sitting in diversity must thereafter apply the sub-
stantive common law of the state in which they sit.3 The following Sep-
tember the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective,
establishing a uniform code of practice for the federal courts that up until
then had largely followed the procedural rules of the state where the fed-
eral court sat.
The net result of the Federal Rules and Erie was a geomagnetic pole
reversal in federal practice. Before 1938, federal courts in common law
diversity matters had applied state procedure (under the Conformity
Act 4) and federal substance (under Swift v. Tyson). After 1938, federal
courts in diversity cases applied federal procedure and state substance.
A. Histoy of Federal Civil Procedure
When the Republic was founded, the Congress delegated to the
Supreme Court the power to regulate procedure. Choice of procedure,
however, was muddled by the joint operation of the Rules of Decision
Act5 and the Process Act of 1792.6 In actions at law, matters subject to
the Rules of Decision Act were governed by the prevailing state proce-
dural law, whereas matters subject to the Process Act were governed by
the state procedural law in effect in 1789. It was not until 1872 that Con-
gress passed the Conformity Act, requiring uniform application of the
local state procedure in all actions at law.
While the federal courts were floundering before 1872 to decide
what procedural rules to follow, state legislatures were being urged to
* DistrictJudge for the Eastern District of New York. A.B., 1954; LL.B., 1959, Fordham Univ.;
LL.M., 1964, New York Univ.; LL.D. 1981, Mercy College. The author gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of Michael J. Farrell and Tina Eve Brier.
1 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3 Id at 78.
4 Act ofJune 1, 1892, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
5 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
6 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
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streamline their procedure. By 1830, Jeremy Bentham had published
his savage attack upon common law evidence and procedure.
7
In the centuries before Bentham and the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, trial by ambush was the standard way to do business. No discov-
ery tools were available to ferret out information about an opponent's
claim or defense. It was the function of the pleadings to identify and
define factual issues.
To be entirely accurate, it should be mentioned that there were two
statutes and two equity rules relating to discovery. The statutes permit-
ted depositions of sick or otherwise unavailable witnesses8 or of wit-
nesses whose testimony had to be preserved to prevent a "failure of
Justice." 9 Both discovery statutes, however, related only to a party's own
case; discovery could not be used to pry into an adversary's claims or
defenses.
Discovery, as we understand that term today, was a creature of eq-
uity. Of the two equity rules, Rule 47 permitted depositions of certain
named witnesses for use at trial in exceptional circumstances. Equity
Rule 58 permitted general discovery through written interrogatories, dis-
covery of documents, and admissions. But, even in the equity courts,
discovery devices were still not available to obtain information about the
opponent's claim or defense.
B. Discovery After 1938
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by the Supreme
Court in 1937 and became effective in 1938.10 Rule 1 trumpets their
purpose: "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action" in actions at law or suits in equity, thereafter to be denomi-
nated civil actions. A new horizon was envisioned. Civil litigation would
henceforth be a search for the truth; and this would best be served by a
full development of all the facts prior to the trial presentation. Signifi-
candy the function of pretrial "issue focusing," formerly the exclusive
role of the pleadings, was now delegated to pretrial discovery devices.
Hollow protestations against "fishing expeditions," as the Supreme
Court said in Hickman v. Taylor,"l would no longer block a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case.
During the last fifty years the federal courts have ceded the parties
virtually unbridled discretion whether and when to file requests, 12 as well
as the sequence and frequency of the requests.13 The fundamental sea
change worked by the 1938 Federal Rules was to minimize the pleadings
as the nautical map of the lawsuit and to assign that role to a vastly ex-
panded, no-holds-barred system of pretrial discovery.
7 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827).
8 28 U.S.C. § 639 (1934).
9 28 U.S.C. § 644 (1934).
10 See FED. R. Civ. P. 86(a).
11 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
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C. Discovery from Experts
Perhaps because experts were not ubiquitous in 1938, little attention
was paid to the question of whether experts should be subject to the
same bruising discovery as lesser mortals. It quickly became apparent
that they were not. Several considerations were thought to protect ex-
perts from the incubus of pretrial discovery.
The most frequently cited reason is that to allow discovery enables
one party to make use of another's trial preparation. The fear is that one
party might try to build his case on the basis of the discovery of the oppo-
sition's expert.
This may be a problem with insurance companies and similar organi-
zations that make careful investigations immediately following an acci-
dent. To make such defendants disgorge such valuable information does
in effect allow one party to take advantage of the other's trial prepara-
tion. But, it may be asked, what has this to do with experts? Most such
investigations would not be protected by a rule denying discovery of ex-
perts since the investigations are generally conducted by people with no
special expertise. A party would certainly be entitled to the names and
testimony of any lay witnesses interviewed by investigators.
In this connection, the "work product" doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor
is often cited as dispositive. That doctrine certainly would seem to pro-
tect the opinion of the expert who is retained just to help the attorney
prepare for trial but who is not expected to testify. With an expert who is
expected to testify, however, it would seem wiser to permit discovery. As
one court indicated concerning discovery of experts: "without prior dis-
covery, cross-examination cannot be expected successfully to perform its
historic function, and effective evidence in rebuttal, though perhaps in
existence, cannot be produced forthwith upon the close of the claimant's
defense .... -14 The court felt this was a sufficient showing of necessity to
allow discovery within the Hickman v. Taylor rule. 15
Confusion also surrounded the discovery of reports and opinions of
an opponent's experts. Some courts allowed discovery of not only names
but also opinions of these experts,' 6 while others refused to permit any
discovery on the subject at all.' 7 Generally, however, only those parts of
the expert's reports setting out facts were ordered to be produced.'
8
The basis for this conclusion is difficult to divine. Where a lay witness
has an opinion that would be admissible evidence, it certainly is permissi-
ble to examine him in advance of the trial concerning that opinion. No
reason is apparent for a different rule applying to experts.
14 United States v. 48Jars, More or Less, Tranquilease, 23 F.R.D. 192, 198 (D.D.C. 1958) (quot-
ing United States v. 132 Cartons Chloresium Tooth Paste (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 1950)).
15 See id.
16 E.g., United States v. 38 Cases, More or Less, Mr. Enzyme, 35 F.R.D. 357, 361-65 (W.D. Pa.
1964), appeal dismissed, 369 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1966); Bergstron Paper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 7
F.R.D. 548, 550 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
17 E.g., United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75, 77-78 (E.D.N.Y.
1962); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 684, 686 (D. Mass. 1947).
18 E.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 233-37 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
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The conflict over discovery of expert witnesses came to a head in
1947 when the District Courts of Ohio and Massachusetts reached oppo-
site conclusions about whether two experts working on the same case
could be deposed. The Ohio court directed a professor from the Case
Institute of Technology to submit to a deposition 19 while the Massachu-
setts court barred a similar deposition by a professor from M.I.T.20 The
Massachusetts court concluded that the M.I.T. expert had acted as the
attorney's agent and because he was privy to exchanges of confidential
information between the client and attorney, fell under the umbrella of
the attorney-client privilege. 21 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit held the
Massachusetts expert in contempt for refusing to testify.
22
The reasoning of cases insulating experts from discovery was criti-
cized as ignoring the limited functions of attorney work product and the
attorney-client privilege. The privilege and its related work product doc-
trine were meant to protect only communications, not facts. An expert's
observations and conclusions, whether or not contained in a report, and
even if partially based on communications with a client, are facts that, if
relevant, constitute evidence. In any event such was the status of expert
discovery until the 1960's. Then the problem roared into prominence.
With the litigation explosion of the 1960's, particularly in the area of
products liability, experts flocked to our courts like migrating geese.
Some might say like invading locusts. In the back of every slick-covered
legal magazine the same eye-catching classified ads appeared. In one,
under the label "addictionologist," a physician offered, for a fee, to pro-
vide expert testimony on alcohol and drug issues.23 In others, specialists
offered expert advice or testimony on bicycle mishaps, battery or bottle
explosions, hot-air balloon accidents, and radiation incidents.
24
The business of being an expert has become a cottage industry. In-
dividuals with knowledge in scores of obscure fields have joined tens of
thousands of doctors, university professors and engineers in the expert
witness industry. They can be hired to bring their learning to court by
nearly anyone able to pay their rates, which can range from $50 an hour
for a law-enforcement expert to more than $10,000 a day for a plastic
surgeon.25
The Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys, established in 1961
and based in Fort Washington, Pa., is one of the oldest and largest of
such enterprises, with a reported annual growth rate of 15 percent. 26 Ac-
cording to its president, Edwin H. Sherman, the service has developed a
nationwide list of about 10,000 experts, grouped in 4000 categories.
27
19 See Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 425, 428 (N.D. Ohio 1947),
aft'd, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948).
20 See Cold Metal Process Co., supra note 17, at 687.
21 Id-
22 Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 167 F.2d 570, 570-71 (6th Cir. 1948).
23 See N.Y: Times, July 5, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
24 See id.
25 See id
26 See id at 13, coi. 1.
27 See id
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It is self-evident that with this horde of experts recasting the mold of
common law trials, the problem of discovery from experts, which had
been a minor irritation and largely of academic interest, became a source
of major concern by 1965. Not surprisingly, this resulted in the creation
of a committee. This committee sorted out the problems, and made a
proposal for change in 1966. By 1970 the committee had agreed upon a
new rule to govern discovery of experts: Federal Rule 26(b)(4).
Mr. John P. Frank, a member of the committee, has expressed the
view that the 1970 amendment to Rule 26(b)(4) was a compromise that
envisioned a diversified approach to discovery of experts expected to be
called: "The tussle in the Rules Committee was what developed into an
eastern and western point of view.... The western practice [was] to the
general effect that experts should testify just as exactly as other witnesses
on discovery. They should not be uncompensated if they have to give
special preparation, but otherwise it's just so much more discovery. In
the East (3rd and 4th Circuits at least), this was not the going practice.
Hence the compromise which the rule represents. ... 28
The new rule is the exclusive way to get discovery from experts. The
rule is configured with two kinds of experts in mind: those who are re-
tained and are expected to be called at trial (subdivision A),29 and those
who are retained to prepare for litigation but who are not expected to be
called (subdivision B). 30 Solely for pedagogical reasons-and intending
no invidious comparison-I will refer to them as Class A and Class B
experts.
I. Class A Experts
It is immediately apparent that the thrust of Rule 26(b)(4) is to pro-
tect the trial-witness expert from being deposed. The rule requires a liti-
gant to answer interrogatories identifying his expertise, summarizing the
"subject matter" of his testimony and stating "the substance of the facts
and opinions" to which he will testify and a "summary of the grounds for
each opinion." Anything beyond that can be obtained only by court
order.
While this may have been a commendable first step towards discov-
ery in 1970, it has-at least since the promulgation of the Federal Rules
of Evidence-become a Neanderthal tool in the chiselling of a lawsuit.
Taking the rule on its own terms, it leaves too much to the imagination.
What is a "subject matter?" What is the "substance of his anticipated
testimony?" What are "facts?" What are "opinions?" These inquiries,
more interesting to the philosophy faculty than the law faculty, generate
sterile quibbles that only derail a suit.
In Rupp v. Vock & Weiderhold, Inc. ,31 for example, defendant was not
at all pleased with plaintiffs' answers to his interrogatories. In their origi-
28 Letter from John P. Frank to Michael H. Graham, Mar. 1, 1976 (quoted in 1976 Il1. L.F. 895,
920-21).
29 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
30 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
31 52 F.R.D. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
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nal response, plaintiffs listed four experts as prospective witnesses and
described as their subject matter: "The machine design,. electrical cir-
cuitry, and human factors engineering. ' 32 The plaintiffs expressly re-
fused to state the substance of the experts' facts and opinions and a
summary of the grounds for the opinions on the ground that the defend-
ant had not yet listed any of its experts as possible witnesses. 33 The
court, after stating that mutuality is not prerequisite to discovery pursu-
ant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A), ordered a supplemental response to include
more precise statements of the experts' expected testimony and the re-
quired "substance and summary.
' ' s4
The most obvious way to end a talmudic debate over whether the
interrogatories comply with the rule is to obtain an order for discovery
and inspection and perhaps even for a deposition. Here, however, we set
sail for terra incognita because there are few reported decisions by which
to chart our compass. Doubtless this is due to the federal rule that dis-
covery orders are rarely appealable. In any event, it leaves district court
judges almost unfettered discretion to do whatever they want; and my
impression is that most district judges have a visceral reluctance to im-
pose upon experts by making them submit to further discovery. There
are occasional intimations to the contrary,3 5 but Wilson v. Resnick 3 6 is the
more typical response to a discovery motion aimed at an expert.
In Wilson, the plaintiff wanted the report of a physician whom the
defendant had retained as an expert witness. The physician had not ex-
amined the plaintiff but planned to base his trial testimony on his review
of all prior medical records in the case. The plaintiff contended that the
defendant's answers to the interrogatories were insufficient.
3 7
The court disagreed, but it also stated that, even if the answers to
interrogatories were insufficient, it would still not order production of the
expert's report.3 8 The court considered interrogatories to be the only
means authorized by Rule 26(b)(4) to obtain initial discovery of facts
known and opinions held by expert witnesses. Turning then to Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(ii), the court stated that reliance upon a mere allegation of
insufficient answers as the basis for compelling production of documents
would circumvent the procedures of Rule 26(b)(4)(A).3 9 The unarticu-
lated assumption of Wilson is that the sole remedy for inadequate answers
to interrogatories is, at least initially, an order compelling more specific
answers to the interrogatories.
This "give them nothing and damn little of that" mindset is at odds
with everything that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set out to ac-
complish fifty years ago. But when it meets the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence at the intersection a major collision occurs.
32 Id at 112.
33 Id at 113.
34 Id at 113-14.
35 See Herbst v. rr&T, 65 F.R.D. 528, 530-31 (D. Conn. 1975).
36 51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence state the basic
conditions for admitting expert opinions. Under Rule 702, a person who
is "qualified as an expert" may give opinion testimony. His qualifications
may come from "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education,"
and he is permitted to testify to scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact issue. Under Rule 704, an expert may base his opin-
ion upon facts or data perceived by or made known to him either at or
before the hearing. Those facts or data need not be admissible in evi-
dence provided they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions upon the subject.
Contrasting the rules for lay opinions with those for expert opinions
is revealing. While Rule 701 limits a lay witness' opinion testimony to
opinions rationally based on his perception, Rule 703 permits an expert
to base his opinions upon "facts or data" perceived by him, or learned by
him either at or before his testimony. This broad language encompasses
everything that the expert may know, not only in general, but about the
particular case. Most significantly, the expert may rely on facts or data
that are inadmissible evidence, provided they are of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the field.
A moment's reflection indicates that the modem evidence rules per-
mit an expert to rely upon the literature, studies, tests, experiments, and
other hearsay matters that form the basis for nearly every recognized
area of expertise. It goes further, however, in permitting, for example, a
physician to give a diagnosis or prognosis based on a variety of sources,
including statements by patients and relatives; reports and opinions from
nurses, technicians, and other doctors; hospital records; and x-rays. The
rule obviates the need for calling many witnesses to authenticate the doc-
uments. While pretrial discovery could reveal deficiencies in the under-
lying data, the cases under Rule 26(b)(4) have been positively stingy in
allowing such discovery beyond the artfully meager answers to interroga-
tories. This makes no sense.
The problem is compounded by Rule 705 of the evidence rules.
Rule 705 is directed at the form of an expert's testimony. Before the
Federal Rules, most courts required experts to respond to a hypothetical
question, an artificial device that caused confusion, delay, and frustra-
tion. Under Rule 705, the hypothetical question may be avoided; all that
is required is that the expert first be qualified and then state his opinion.
Nothing requires him on direct examination to give the reasons for his
opinion, let alone the underlying facts or data.
This marked change in the form of expert testimony is a welcome
development in trial practice, but it places additional burdens on adver-
sary counsel. In order to determine how to attack an expert's opinion,
and whether to explore the reasoning behind it or the facts underlying
the opinion, the opposing attorney in a civil case must learn all that infor-
mation in advance. For Rule 705 to operate fairly, therefore, extensive
pretrial discovery of experts is essential. Thus far there is little indication
that such broad discovery is generally available.
[Vol. 63:760
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III. Class B Experts
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) governs discovery from expert witnesses who are
retained by an adversary but who are not expected to testify at trial. A
party may obtain discovery from such an expert only on a showing of
"exceptional circumstances." The advisory committee note defines ex-
ceptional circumstances as circumstances "under which it is impractica-
ble for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the
same subject by other means."
40
A threshold inquiry of enormous significance is how a party goes
about learning who has been consulted by his adversary. Wright and
Miller have interpreted the advisory committee note to mean that a party
ordinarily may discover the names of an adverse party's retained or spe-
cially employed experts who are not to be called at trial.4 1 Wright and
Miller conclude that a "proper showing" by "ancillary procedure" (pre-
sumably an interrogatory) is defeated only if the party resisting disclo-
sure establishes either that the names of the experts are irrelevant or that
a valid reason exists for nondisclosure of those names. 42
The court in Sea Colony, Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co. 43 adopted the
Wright and Miller view and concluded that the identity of a non-witness
retained expert must be disclosed.44 The court in Sea Colony did not re-
quire "exceptional circumstances" to obtain the name, but it volunteered
that the test of "exceptional circumstances" would apply to discovery of
any reports prepared by the expert.
45
In Peny v. W.S. Darley & Co.,46 however, another court disagreed,
concluding that the "exceptional circumstances" test applied even to dis-
covery of the mere identity of non-witness experts.47 In both decisions
discovery of the identity of the expert was coupled with, or thought to be
preliminary to, an attempt to obtain disclosure of the expert's reports.
Of course, both courts agreed that the "exceptional circumstances" test
would apply to discovery of the expert's reports.
Having discovered the name of an expert whom the adversary con-
sulted but does not now intend to call as a witness, a healthy curiosity will
often lead to an interview with the expert. There is nothing unethical in
this, although at least one federal court concluded that it can be a viola-
tion of Rule 26(b)(4).48 The odds are at least even that this will uncover
proof that the expert concluded that the adversary who retained him was
in fact at fault. Then we are at the Rubicon: May the expert now be
called as witness against the party who initially retained him (and pre-
sumably paid him for an unfavorable report)? Not surprisingly, compet-
ing notions of ethical values have compelled different results.
40 FED. R. Civ. P. 26, note to 1970 amendment.
41 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2032, at 255 n.31 (1970).
42 Id
43 63 F.R.D. 113 (D. Del. 1974).
44 id at 114.
45 Id
46 54 F.R.D. 278 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
47 I at 280.
48 Ager v.Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training School, 622 F.2d 496, 501-02 (10th Cir. 1980).
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In my own State of New York the courts have wrestled with their
consciences only to arrive at different results. In Gugliano v. Levi, 49 for
example, the defendant in a malpractice action retained a Doctor Roen
who gave the defendant a report that devastated his case. Plaintiff
learned about this and then subpoenaed the doctor to compel him to
testify for the plaintiff.50 Reversing, the New York Appellate Division
wrote:
The plaintiff's use of Dr. Roen and his report constituted a basi-
cally improper trial tactic. It enabled plaintiff to turn unfairly to his
advantage the opinion of an expert for the defense who had already
been engaged by his adversaries and had reported to them, though
plaintiff himself lacked no expert testimony in proof of his own cause
of action. It permitted plaintiff indirectly to contravene the interdic-
tions contained in the present practice code covering discovery proce-
dures, which absolutely prohibit the utilization of an attorney's work
product by his adversary and which conditionally bar his use, without
prior leave of the court, of the opinion of an expert who had been
retained by an opposing party.... In our judgment, where the expert
called is a person who has been employed by the opposing party, and
where, in a discovery proceeding prior to trial, the court had not made
any finding of difficulty in obtaining other expert testimony, there is
no warrant.., to allow one party to subpoena as a witness the other
party's expert and to admit into evidence such expert's report to his
employer. The practice thrusts the expert into the intolerable position
of working for both sides, and into violation of his "ethical obligation
not to accept a retainer from the other side."
51
This ethical sensitivity does not appear to have infected the federal
courts in New York, where the Second Circuit has on at least two occa-
sions expressly sanctioned the practice of compelling experts to testify
against the party who first retained them. The earlier case is Carter-Wal-
lace, Inc. v. Otte,52 where the precise issue was whether the testimony of an
expert witness given in a prior trial was admissible in a second trial when
the expert was not unavailable. The argument was that the prior testi-
mony should be admissible because the trial court could not compel the
expert's testimony. This contention was rejected. According to the late
Judge Friendly, the weight of authority is that federal courts have the
power to subpoena any expert witness and require him to state whatever
opinions he previously has formed. 53
In Kaufman v. Edelstein,54 Judge Friendly reinforced Carter-Wallace by
rejecting the contention that an expert has a "privilege" not to testify
solely on the basis that the expert "owns" his knowledge and may suffer
financially by being called often to testify. 55 Despite the paucity of fed-
eral authority, the view expressed by Judge Friendly is supported by
49 24 A.D.2d 591, 262 N.Y.S.2d 372 (2d Dep't 1965).
50 Id. at 591, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
51 Id. at 591-92, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 374 (quoting 3J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEw YORK
CIVIL PRACTxICE 3101.52, at 31-48 (citations omitted)).
52 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973).
53 See id. at 536.
54 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976).
55 Id at 821.
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commentators and the majority of state courts. Coincidentally, the New
York Court of Appeals has recently entered the majority camp, noting
that there can really be no ethical dilemma when the expert is merely
being compelled to tell the truth.56
If it has now become the majority rule that a party may compel his
opponent's expert to testify, it may seriously be questioned whether the
rule that a class B expert is immune from discovery (absent exceptional
circumstances) should continue. It is certainly an interesting notion that
an expert may be subjected to a trial subpoena, but not to a discovery
subpoena.
IV. Conclusion
While the general rules governing pretrial disclosure in federal
courts are now fairly well understood, their application to discovery from
experts remains enshrouded in obscurity. The problem has been exacer-
bated with the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which just about
free experts from the evidentiary rules that govern lesser mortals. Su-
perimposing the stingy discovery provision of Rule 26(b)(4) upon the
free-floating rules of Article 7 of the Rules of Evidence, the trial lawyer is
often compelled to undertake cross-examination by entering a minefield,
not knowing when he is going to step on the one question that will blow
his case into eternity.
Rule 26(b)(4) should be totally recast to make discovery against ex-
perts freely available, the rule rather than the exception. Not only will
this remove the gamesmanship from cross-examination of experts, but it
will also increase the likelihood of settlements, which to a trial judge are
much closer to godliness than is cleanliness.
56 See Gilly v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 509, 512, 508 N.E.2d 901,902-03, 516 N.Y.S.2d 166,
167-68 (1987) (per curiam).
